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Abstract
With the increasing demand for tuna products and dwindling marine resources, there is a need to promote 
sustainability measures. By far, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is one of the most damaging 
problems in the fishing industry because it directly affects fisheries stocks. In this study, we identified the level 
of IUU fishing, particularly underreporting of tuna catch, in the Philippines. Moreover, we also identified the 
drivers of IUU fishing and the implications of IUU activities to the technical efficiency (TE) performance of 
fishing vessels. We collected the samples in General Santos City, the tuna capital of the Philippines. There were 
two data sets gathered in this study: an annual panel data (2012−2014) of reported inputs and catch level of 216 
registered fishing vessels at the Fish Port Authority and primary data (2014) involving 40 handline tuna fishers. 
The latter data, assumed to be closer to the “true” level of inputs and catches, were compared per vessel to the 
former data set. It revealed a widespread underreporting of catches by 51%−100%. Underreporting is more 
prevalent among vessels of smaller size. Using stochastic frontier analysis, the TE scores of the tuna fishing vessels 
were overestimated to 0.80 (2012), 0.70 (2013), and 0.72 (2014) using the panel data while the primary data (2014) 
set suggested a lower TE score of 0.66. This implies that the actual efficiency performance of the handline tuna 
fishers could be lower by 6% if reporting were true and correct. Hence, we recommend increasing penalties for 
IUU fishing, increasing frequency of monitoring activities such as the Fisheries Observer Program, and promoting 
an enabling environment for small-scale fishers. 
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Introduction
Fisheries are a stable source of food around the 
globe and play a crucial role in food security in 
developing and developed countries. According 
to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (2016), the global aquatic food 
production has been increasing over the years, 
reaching 167.2 million metric tons (MT) in 2014, 
with 93.4 million MT (56%) contribution from 
capture fisheries and the remaining 73.8 million 
MT (44%) from aquaculture. The current level 
of captured fisheries production is way above 
the maximum potential fish production of 80 
million MT (FAO 2010). As a result, the global 
trend of world marine stocks since 1974 shows 
an increasing share of overfished species from 
roughly 10% to 30% of the total stocks (FAO 2016). 
This continued pressure on marine resources is 
a consequence of increased fish demand due to 
increasing human population (Merino et al. 2012).
The sustainability of the world fisheries 
remains an immense challenge to the entire 
sector. Among the many problems faced 
by global fisheries, illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing is considered as one 
of the major threats to marine ecosystems (FAO 
2014). What constitutes IUU fishing is a range 
of unconventional and unsustainable fishing 
activities, from fishing without permission from 
the state to misreporting of catch data to the 
authorities and fishing in a manner not consistent 
with the conservation and management measures 
of the fisheries organizations (FAO 2001). 
Competing for dwindling marine resources, IUU 
fishing has become more prevalent during the late 
twentieth century and currently has become an 
economic, legal, and political problem in marine 
fisheries (Baird 2004). Moreover, IUU fishing has 
also become an international problem (Schmidt 
2004). An estimated 11 to 26 million MT, which 
is equivalent to US$ 10 to 23 billion annually, was 
lost due to IUU activities (FAO 2014).
The Philippines is among the top 12 major 
producers in the world, contributing a total 
of 2.14 million MT in 2014 (FAO 2016). The 
Philippine fisheries provide food for over 90 
million Filipinos with per capita consumption 
of 38 kg per year and a source of livelihood for 
1.4 million fishers (Perez et al. 2012). Also, the 
Philippines contribute to the world consumption 
of aquatic food, particularly tuna products, in the 
three largest export markets: the United States, the 
European Union, and Japan (Garrett and Brown 
2009). Despite this global performance, IUU 
activities are widespread in the country, resulting 
in a trade sanction warning from the European 
Union (European Commission 2014).
In the Philippines, IUU activities include 
unauthorized fishing by both Filipino and foreign 
fishing vessels, unsustainable fishing practices, 
unregulated fishing by unregistered fishing vessels, 
and unreported fishing (Palma 2008). Tuna vessels 
are identified to be among those involved in IUU 
fishing (Barut and Garvilles 2013). The most 
common IUU problem in the Philippines is the 
underreporting of marine catch (Pramod et al. 
2008). Unlicensed commercial fishing vessels and 
incorrect registration as municipal fishing boats 
are the usual cases of IUU fishing (Alesna et al. 
2004; Pomeroy and Pido 1995). The catching of 
juvenile tuna has also been reported to be rampant 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, which 
includes the Philippines (Bailey et al. 2013). All of 
these activities resulted in the lack of adequate data 
to estimate the catch levels, which could serve as a 
good basis for policy formulation (Palomares et al. 
2014).
The Philippines, as one of the biggest 
exporters of tuna products, has to actively respond 
to IUU fishing in order to maintain its global 
reputation. The tuna capital of the Philippines, 
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General Santos City (Figure 1), houses the major 
tuna landing area: the General Santos Fish Port 
Complex (GSFPC). The highest catch over the 
last twelve years was recorded in 2014, reaching 
193,867 MT; but 53% of this catch were frozen 
tuna imports, 77% of which from foreign and 23% 
from Manila suppliers (Espejo 2015b). It should 
be noted also that most of these catch landings 
are sourced from distant waters like the Celebes 
Sea, the Indonesian borders, the Pacific, and near 
Papua New Guinea (Macusi et al. 2015). On the 
other hand, tuna catches from Mindanao covering 
Regions 9 to 13 and the Autonomous Region for 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) revealed a decreasing 
trend over the last fifty years (Parducho and 
Palomares 2014). Three main gears are utilized in 
tuna fishing: purse seine, handline, and longline. 
Purse-seine fleets catch mostly skipjack used 
primarily for canning, handline vessels catch 
adult yellowfin used as high-grade sashimi, and 
longline fleets catch yellowfin and bigeye tuna fish 
in distant waters (Bailey et al. 2012). The handline 
industry in General Santos City was identified as 
an area of concern in terms of IUU fishing despite 
being known to be more sustainable compared to 
other fishing methods as it targets mature stocks 
of yellowfin tuna (West et al. 2011). According to 
West et al. (2011), there is inadequate information 
on the handline sector as well as regulations 
resulting to concerns in three areas—fisheries 
assessment, management, and compliance.
In this paper, we identify the level of IUU 
activities in the tuna industry, particularly 
underreporting of tuna catch, identify the 
drivers of IUU fishing, and estimate the effect 
of underreporting on the technical efficiency 
performance of the tuna handline vessels. Our 
approach in estimating underreporting was 
limited to the comparison of survey data from 
reported official data. Potential endogeneity 
issues could be present in the technical efficiency 
model. While still far from arriving at a robust 
estimate of the IUU activities, our effort provides 
an indication of the extent of underreporting of 
tuna catches in the Philippines and its implication 
to efficiency performance. 
Methods
In marine economics, one of the most common 
approaches to efficiency modelling is the 
estimation of technical, allocative, and economic 
efficiency. Most researchers prefer this approach 
in modelling the efficiency performance of the 












4 ojs.upmin.edu.phBANWA B (2017) 12:res004
Vázquez-Rowe and Tyedmers 2013). However, 
Tidd et al. (2016) cautioned that underreporting 
issues in the early years of the period 1994−2010 
among Western Pacific purse-seine fleets could 
be the reason behind the productivity gains in 
the later years. Hence, this research posits that 
underreporting can affect the efficiency levels of 
the fishing vessels resulting in an overestimation 
of efficiency performance.
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) has been 
widely used in efficiency modelling. This approach 
has been applied in the context of marine fishing 
(Del Hoyo et al. 2004; Esmaeili 2006; Jamnia 
et al. 2015; Solís et al. 2014) and aquaculture 
farming (Bukenya et al. 2013; Iliyasu et al. 2016). 
SFA is preferred over the nonparametric data 
envelopment analysis because it can model the 
production function through Cobb-Douglas or 
Translog specification with sources of inefficiency 
(Coelli et al. 2005). In the Philippine fisheries 
literature, technical efficiency studies are limited 
to the aquaculture sector (Bimbao et al. 2000; 
Dey et al. 2000; Irz and Mckenzie 2003). To date, 
there are no studies on technical efficiency in the 
Philippine marine fisheries setting.
In our research, the dependent variable 
considered was the output of the fishing vessels 
and the independent variables were the inputs to 
production such as the gross registered tonnage 
(GRT) of the fishing vessels, the effort days of 
the fishermen at sea, the fuel consumption of the 
fishing vessel measured in liters, and the water 
consumption of the fishing vessel during the 
operation measured in cubic meters. The output 
variable total catch is expressed in metric tons 
(Del Hoyo et al. 2004; Esmaeili 2006). Moreover, 
variables such as the GRT (Del Hoyo et al. 
2004), the effort days (Esmaeili 2006), and fuel 
consumption (Squires and Kirkley 1999) are all 
hypothesized to be positively affecting the output 
level of the fishing vessels. Water consumption, on 
the other hand, was identified as among the inputs 
of longline vessels (Sharma and Leung 1998). In 
this study, water was among the major inputs used 
by fishing vessels in General Santos City.
We hypothesize three primary sources of 
efficiency performance in this study: first, the 
technical control measure such as closed areas 
and closed seasons, which is proxied by berthing 
days (Srinath and Pillai 2006); second, the fishing 
ground represented through distance using ordinal 
data is a potential source of inefficiency (Sesabo 
and Tol 2007); third, fishing season represented 
by the month and year of fishing can also explain 
the sources of inefficiency (Kirkley et al. 1998). 
All of the potential determinants of inefficiency 
are hypothesized to either result to a positive or 
negative coefficient. In our study, the sources of 
technical inefficiency include the berthing days of 
the fishing vessels, the area of the fishing ground, 
the harbor where the fishing vessels land their 
catch, and the corresponding quarters of the year 
of the catch landing. The description of the output, 
inputs, and sources of inefficiency variables are 
shown in Table 1. 
We analyzed two data sets in this study: 
first, panel data of 216 registered fishing vessels 
from the years 2012, 2013, and 2014 (PFDA 
2015), and second, a cross-section data of 2014 
primary survey involving 40 handline tuna 
fishing vessels. The total sample represents 9% 
of the 451 total registered vessel having less 
than 250 GRT (BFAR and WCPFC 2012). The 
Cobb-Douglas specification (Equation 1) and 
Translog specification (Equation 2) with sources 
of inefficiency (Equation 3) were considered in 
modelling the production frontier (Esmaeili 2006; 
Iliyasu et al. 2016; Sesabo and Tol 2007; Sharma 
and Leung 1998).
lnOutputit = β0 + β1lnGRTit + β2lnEffit + 
β3lnFuelit + β4lnWaterit + (vit − μit)
(1)
lnOutputit = β0 + β1lnGRTit + β2lnEffit + 












+ (vit − μit)
(2)
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TABLE 1     Description of the output, inputs and sources of inefficiency variables
Short name Variable name Description
OUTPUT
Volume Volume Total catch in metric tons in 2012, 2013, and 2014
INPUTS
GRT Gross registered tonnage Tonnage size of the fishing vessel
Eff Effort days Total number of days spent for searching and fishing in 2012, 2013, and 
2014
Fuel Fuel consumption Total number of liters of fuel spent for searching and fishing in 2012, 2013, 
and 2014
Water Water consumption Total number of cubic meters of water spent for searching and fishing in 
2012, 2013, and 2014
SOURCES OF TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY
Berthing Berthing days Total number of berthing or mooring days in 2012, 2013, and 2014
Moro Fishing ground: Moro Gulf Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Moro Gulf depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Sulawesi Fishing ground: Sulawesi Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Sulawesi depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Sarangani Fishing ground: Sarangani Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Sarangani depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Pacific Fishing ground: Pacific Ocean Takes the value of 0.01 if the vessel fishes in Pacific Ocean depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Sulu Fishing ground: Sulu Sea Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Sulu Sea depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
HSP Fishing ground: High Seas Pocket 1 Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in High Seas Pocket 1 depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
PNG Fishing ground: Papua New Guinea Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Papua New Guinea depend-
ing on output level; 0 otherwise
Palawan Fishing ground: Palawan Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Palawan depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Manila Fishing ground: Manila Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Manila depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Centro Fishing ground: Centro Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Centro depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Indonesia Fishing ground: Indonesia Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Indonesia depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Mati Fishing ground: Mati Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Mati depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Tawi-Tawi Fishing ground: Tawi-Tawi Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Tawi-Tawi depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
Celebes Fishing ground: Celebes Sea Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in Celebes Sea depending 
on output level; 0 otherwise
H1 Harbor 1 Harbor 1 depending on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
H2 Harbor 2 Harbor 2 depending on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
H3 Harbor 3 Harbor 3 depending on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
Q1 Fishing period: 1st quarter of 2012, 
2013, and 2014
Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in the 1st quarter depending 
on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
Q2 Fishing period: 2nd quarter of 2012, 
2013, and 2014
Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in the 2nd quarter depending 
on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
Q3 Fishing period: 3rd quarter of 2012, 
2013, and 2014
Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in the 3rd quarter depending 
on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
Q4 Fishing period: 4th quarter of 2012, 
2013, and 2014
Takes the value of 0.01 to 1 if vessel fishes in the 4th quarter depending 
on the share of output level; 0 otherwise
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operate in the waters of the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Palau, the High Seas, and Papua New Guinea (Vera 
and Hipolito 2006). However, most of these fishing 
vessels are unregistered or erroneously registered 
as municipal vessels to minimize the registration 
cost (Alesna et al. 2004; Vera and Hipolito 2006).
Since 2008, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR) of the Department of 
Agriculture started a system wherein the inputs 
for fishing, including effort days and the total 
catch, are recorded in logsheets for the purse 
seine and ringnet vessels. The bureau also started 
requiring canning factories to report their monthly 
unloading data to BFAR (Barut and Garvilles 
2014). From these logsheets (official report), we 
compared the response of 40 handline tuna fishing 
vessels in terms of the level of inputs and outputs. 
The comparison is only applicable to small-scale 
vessels, with 65% of the sample having less than 
5 GRT, 21% with 5−10 GRT, and the remaining 
14% with more than 10 GRT. 
There was widespread underreporting of 
catch level among the small-scale handline tuna 
vessels. Out of the 40 vessels, only 3 respondents 
(7.5%) disclosed near the accurate level of catch 
(0%−50% deviation) as recorded by the Philippine 
Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) during 
the last time they landed in the fish port. The 
remaining 37 respondents (92.5%) underreported 
their latest catch. Of these 37 respondents, 
16 (40%) underreported at 51%−100%, 9 (22.5%) 
at 101%−150%, 7 (17.5%) at 151%−200% , and the 
remaining 5 (12.5%) at over 200%. This implies 
that for every 1000 kg reported, there is 501 to 
1000 kg that is unreported (i.e., 51%−100% level 
of underreporting).
Moreover, the level of underreporting 
increases as the size of the vessel decreases 
(Table 3). Vessels having 0%−50% lower level of 
reported catch had an average of 23.17 GRT, those 
with 51%−100% lower level of reported catch had 
an average of 10.11 GRT, those with 101%−150% 
lower level of reported catch had an average of 
9.06 GRT, those with 151%−200% lower level of 
reported catch had an average of 7.03 GRT, and 
those with more than 200% lower level of reported 
catch had an average of 4.06 GRT. Hence, there is 
a high rate of underreporting in vessels of smaller 
size. However, this could be due to the fact that 
vessels operating in the municipal waters are not 
μit = z0 + z1Berthingit + z2Moroit 
+ z3Sulawesiit + z4Saranganiit 
+ z5Pacificit + z6Suluit + z7HSPit 
+ z8PNGit + z9Palawanit 
+ z10Manilait + z11Centroit 
+ z12Indonesiait + z13Matiit 
+ z14Tawi-Tawiit + z15Celebesit 
+ z16H1it + z17H2it + z18H3it + z19Q1it 
+ z20Q2it + z21Q3it + z22Q4it 
+ wit
(3)
NOTE:  In all equations, i represents the vessel observation, 
t represents the time observation, β represents the coefficient of 
the input parameters, z represents the coefficient of the inefficiency 
parameters, and μit represents the inefficiency level of vessel i at time t.
We used the likelihood ratio test in hypothesis 
testing to identify which among the models best 
fit the data (Coelli et al. 2005). Also, we utilized 
the mixed chi-squared distribution to obtain 
the critical values for hypothesis testing (Kodde 
and Palm 1986). We show the comparison of the 
summary statistics of the two data sets in Table 2. 
In this study, we used the software FRONTIER 4.1 
since it can accommodate an unbalanced panel 
data (Coelli 1996).
Results and Discussion
Level of IUU Fishing 
The commercial tuna fishing sector can be 
divided into three types of operation: the small 
scale (3.1−20.0 GRT), which utilizes passive or 
active gears; medium scale (20.1−150.0 GRT), 
which utilizes active gears; and large scale 
(>150 GRT), which also utilizes active gears 
(Vera et al. 2007). Most of the fishing vessels with 
GRT equal to or lesser than 3 normally fish in 
municipal waters, and the rest of the large fishing 
vessels fish in commercial fishing grounds (Vera 
and Hipolito 2006). Among the commercial tuna-
fishing vessels, the handline sector (mostly small 
scale) is of interest in this study.
Handline tuna vessels are the primary 
producer of grade A tuna for export to other 
countries as either fresh, frozen, or processed 
products. These small-scale fishing vessels manage 
to maintain the quality of the fresh yellowfin tuna 
due to minimal effort days at sea, which usually 
span three to ten days (BFAR and WCPFC 2012). 
An estimated 3000 to 4000 handline fishing vessels 
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TABLE 3     Summary statistics of output, inputs, and sources of inefficiency variables
Level of underreporting (%) Percentage to total sample
Gross registered tonnage
Average Minimum Maximum
0−50   7.50 23.17 1.50 65.00
51−100 40.00 10.11 0.50 51.00
101−150 22.50   9.06 2.00 19.00
151−200 17.50   7.03 2.00 15.00
Above 200 12.50   4.06 2.00 15.00
 
TABLE 2     Summary statistics of output, inputs, and sources of inefficiency variables
Variable
Panel data (n = 296) Cross-section data (n = 34)
  Mean Standard deviation   Min      Max   Mean
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max
Period   2.25 0.68   1.00      3.00   1.00 0.00   1.00   1.00
lnVol   1.22   0.73 −1.00      5.30   2.93   0.53   1.70   3.90
lnGRT   1.18   0.49   0.43      3.13   0.56  0.41 −0.30   1.18
lnEff   2.39   0.24   0.85      2.56   1.24  0.18   0.85   1.48
lnFuel   0.24   0.56 −1.30      1.70 −0.01   0.42 −1.05   0.60
lnWater   1.31   0.52   0.00      2.69   0.05   0.36 −0.74   0.62
Berthing 37.08 34.28   1.00  209.00   7.97 10.62   1.00 45.00
Moro   0.90   0.22   0.00      1.00   0.06   0.24   0.00   1.00
Sulu   0.04   0.13   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
Sarangani   0.02   0.05   0.00      0.41 - -   -   -
Pacific   0.02   0.08   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
Sulu   0.01   0.07   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
HSP   0.01   0.09   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
PNG   0.01   0.08   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
Palawan   0.00   0.06   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
Manila   0.00   0.06   0.00      1.00 - -   -   -
Centro   0.00   0.01   0.00      0.11   0.38   0.49   0.00   1.00
Indonesia  -  - -     -   0.41   0.50   0.00   1.00
Mati  -  - -     -   0.06   0.24   0.00   1.00
Tawi-Tawi  -  - -     -   0.06   0.24   0.00   1.00
Celebes  -  - -     -   0.03   0.17   0.00   1.00
H1   0.70   0.40   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
H2   0.20   0.33   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
H3   0.10   0.29   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
Q1   0.22   0.24   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
Q2   0.25   0.22   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
Q3   0.26   0.22   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
Q4   0.27   0.25   0.00      1.00 - - -   -
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required to report their catches to BFAR or other 
recording agencies.
Drivers of IUU Fishing
The drivers of IUU fishing can be both 
internal and external. The decision-making 
process of the fishermen could be a factor of the 
socio-demographic profile, the profit-sharing 
scheme involved, and the relationship between the 
fishermen and the vessel owner. The effectiveness 
of the policies and regulations are considered 
external factors affecting IUU activities. 
Tuna fishermen are mainly from small-scale 
fishing communities surrounding the coasts 
of General Santos City. According to Allen and 
Gough (2006), more than 60% of the Filipino 
crew members grew up in a fishing or farming 
area, and most of them reported only finishing 
high school with a few completing associate or 
trade school degrees related to maritime studies. 
Results of our interviews show that the fishermen 
had accumulated 21.47 years of experience in 
marine fishing as they started to fish as early as 
20.55 years old. The respondents, who are boat 
captains, had an average age of 42.02 years old. 
According to Peji (2014), most of the fishermen in 
General Santos City are middle-aged and in their 
prime and most productive years, supporting a 
family of four to six members with their meager 
income. Moreover, an average fisherman earns a 
living of PhP 25,426 (1992) annually, with 27% of 
them having motorized boats (Barut et al. 2003). 
The extra income from IUU fishing could help 
provide for the needs of the small-scale handline 
tuna fishers’ families.
The profit sharing in tuna fishing is another 
driver to IUU fishing. The profit-sharing system 
of the owner and operators of the fishermen exist 
in two forms: lilima sharing system and sukod 
sharing system (BFAR and WCPFC 2012). In 
the lilima sharing system, 20% share from the 
actual gross sale goes to the fishermen and the 
remaining 80% goes to the owner of the fishing 
vessel. In some instance, the boat captains are also 
the boat owners. In the sukod sharing system, the 
operator has an almost equal share of the net sales 
like the owner. Here, the operator, who could also 
be the boat captain, is considered as a partner of 
the vessel owner, which means that the operator 
is also responsible for the cost of each fishing trip 
(BFAR and WCPFC 2012). Since there are fishing 
seasons wherein the fishermen have no catch 
and incur losses, owners (sometimes aided by 
financiers) experience financial setbacks. There are 
vessel owners and/or financiers who are very strict 
toward their operators regarding the minimum 
level of tuna catch when the fishing vessel lands 
in the fish port. Also, according to Peji (2014), a 
feudal relationship exists between operators and 
financiers. Since these owners and/or financiers 
spend a large sum of money for each fishing trip, 
they get suspicious of their operators when little 
or no tuna are caught during the trip. According 
to anecdotal evidence, operators sometimes take 
advantage of a large catch by selling a portion of 
their catch to other buyers before docking in the 
fish port. Also, official reports are underreported 
to reduce taxes (Vera and Hipolito 2007). This 
contributes to the underreporting of tuna catch.
The unregulated fishing effort is one of the 
causes of the declining productivity of the fishing 
industry (Carreon 2004). While licensing has the 
potential to minimize IUU activities, the deficient 
monitoring, control, and surveillance over the 
registered fishing vessels contribute to the fishers’ 
decision to engage in IUU activities (Alesna et al. 
2004). Monitoring and surveillance are already 
implemented by BFAR and the local government 
units (LGUs) in coordination with the private 
sector (BFAR and WCPFC 2012). Recently, the 
Indonesian government conducted a crackdown 
against Filipino fishing vessels as they are no 
longer allowed to operate in Indonesia’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) (Espejo 2015a). Because 
of this adverse policy change, Filipino vessels, 
including handline vessels, are heavily affected.
Implications of IUU Fishing to 
Technical Efficiency
The two data sets used in our study differ in 
terms of the levels of inputs and catch. The panel 
data set has lower levels of catch compared to the 
cross-section data set, with the latter’s level of catch 
assumed to be closer to the true value. In this case, 
the latter data set was used to interpret the factors 
affecting the efficiency performance, and the 
technical efficiency levels were compared across 
data sets. The deviation in the technical efficiency 
level could be attributed to underreporting of 
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catch level (i.e., IUU activity).
We performed standard hypotheses testing 
to identify the (1) the absence of the constant 
term of the technical inefficiency model, (2) the 
absence of the technical inefficiency terms, and (3) 
the appropriate production function, i.e., whether 
the Cobb-Douglas or the Translog specification 
best fit the data (Coelli et al. 2005). As a result of 
the series of hypothesis testing, we found that the 
Cobb-Douglas with technical inefficiency constant 
term is the best model for the panel data while 
the Cobb-Douglas without technical inefficiency 
constant term is the best model for the cross-
section data (Table 4). The technical efficiency 
models for both data sets are significant at 0.01 
level of error (alpha).
According to the models (Table 5), the vessel 
size positively affected the productivity of the 
vessel. A 1% increase in the vessel size increases 
total catch by 0.56%, but not significantly if there 
is underreporting. In the panel data model, vessel 
size suggests a positive effect to tuna catch, which 
is consistent with the results of Del Hoyo et al. 
(2004). The fishing vessel size also determines the 
type of gears used, which affect the productivity. 
In particular, commercial vessels that use ringnet, 
trawl, bagnet, and purse seine have an average 
annual catch of 26,250 to 132,858 kg while 
municipal vessels that use drive-in net, fish 
corral, beach seine, and gillnet have an average 
catch of 938 to 78,157 kg (Trinidad et al. 1993). 
However, Pomeroy and Pido (1995) argued that 
the small and medium trawlers in the Philippines 
are categorized as unmotorized gillnetters under 
municipal registration, and this results to conflicts 
between small-scale traditional fishers and 
trawl fishers as they compete for limited coastal 
resources. Moreover, the limited capabilities of 
municipalities constrained the implementation 
of coastal fishery laws leading to further resource 
exploitation (Pomeroy and Pido 1995).
In terms of effort days at sea, a 1% increase in 
the number of days at sea decreases total catch by 
1.18%; however, with underreporting, the effect 
was positive. The positive effect of effort days 
to tuna is consistent with the study of Esmaeili 














H0: δ0 = 0
     Cobb-Douglas  −147.23 −139.86   14.74   1 (0.01)   5.41 Reject H0
     Translog −148.75 −146.40   4.7   1 (0.01)   5.41 Fail to reject H0
H0: γ = 0
     Cobb-Douglas −174.19 −139.86   68.66 19 (0.01)  35.56 Reject H0
     Translog  −168.88 −148.75   40.26 18 (0.01) 34.17 Reject H0
H0: β5 + . . . + β10 = 0
     H0: Cobb-Douglas vs H1: Translog  −139.86 −148.75  −17.78  9 (0.01)  20.97 Fail to reject H0
CROSS-SECTION DATA       
H0: δ0 = 0
     Cobb-Douglas      0.13     −1.27   −2.79   1 (0.01)   5.41 Fail to reject H0
     Translog     −3.27        1.20     8.95   1 (0.01)   5.41 Reject H0
H0: γ = 0
     Cobb-Douglas    −15.24      0.13   30.74  7 (0.01)   17.76 Reject H0
     Translog   −10.21        1.20   22.82  7 (0.01)  17.76 Reject H0
H0: β5 + . . . + β10 = 0
     H0: Cobb-Douglas vs H1: Translog      0.13       1.20    2.14   11 (0.01)  24.05 Fail to reject H0
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(2006). This implies that accounting for the actual 
effort days at sea, there was a decreasing effect to 
catch productivity. According to Gutierez (2014), 
handline fishermen need to travel to farther 
fishing grounds and stay longer days in those 
fishing grounds in order to catch tuna. They fish 
tuna as far as the High Seas Pocket 1 of the Pacific 
Ocean (Barut and Garvilles 2014). The High Seas 
Pocket 1 is a shared region bounded by Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea (south), Palau (west), and 
Micronesia (north and east) (WCPFC 2012). Small 
fishing vessels usually increase fuel or crewdays to 
maintain the same level of fishing effort (Padilla 
and Trinidad 1995). However, Carreon (2004) 
suggested that the effort days of fishermen should 
be minimized since it contributes to higher cost 
but does not improve the productivity of the 
vessel. The ideal effort days is less than ten days 
TABLE 5     Technical efficiency performance of the tuna fishing vessels
 Parameters
Panel data Cross-section data
Coefficient Standard error T-ratio Coefficient
Standard 
error T-ratio
beta 0: Constant −0.30 0.31 −0.98     4.62 0.43    10.63***
beta 1: GRT   0.67 0.06  12.17***     0.38 0.44 0.87 
beta 2: Effort   0.28 0.11  2.48**   −1.18 0.23     −5.08***
beta 3: Fuel  0.15 0.06  2.50**   −0.44 0.25    −1.77*
beta 4: Water   0.29 0.06    4.84***     0.92 0.68   1.35
delta 0: Constant −0.93 0.72  −1.29 - - -
delta 1: Berthing −0.00 0.00  −1.45     0.00 0.03   −0.15
delta 2: Moro   1.07 0.55     1.96*    0.96 0.45      2.14**
delta 3: Sulawesi   0.79 0.70   1.13 - - -
delta 4: Sarangani −0.44 1.24  −0.36 - -    -
delta 5: Pacific −2.36 0.92     −2.58** - - -
delta 6: Sulu   1.26 0.67     1.87* - - -
delta 7: HSP −0.64 1.28 −0.50 - - -
delta 8: PNG −2.24 0.67       −3.32*** - - -
delta 9: Palawan −1.13 0.90  −1.26 - - -
delta 10: Manila −1.13 0.90  −1.26 - - -
delta 11: Centro   1.49 2.16   0.69    0.60 0.26    2.35**
delta 12: Indonesia - - -  −0.04 0.51  −0.07
delta 13: Mati - - -  −2.97 1.12    −2.64**
delta 14: Tawi-Tawi - - -   −1.85 1.05   −1.76
delta 15: Celebes - - -     0.52 0.82      0.64
delta 16: H1   0.33 0.56    0.58 - - -
delta 17: H2   0.26 0.56   0.47 - - -
delta 18: H3 −1.52 0.81    −1.88* - - -
delta 19: Q1 −0.13 0.56  −0.23 - - -
delta 20: Q2   0.12 0.57   0.21 - - -
delta 21: Q3 −0.30 0.63 −0.48 - - -
delta 22: Q4   0.07 0.56   0.13 - - -
sigma squared (σ2)   0.23 0.03      8.04***    0.22 0.09      2.50**
gamma (γ)   0.64 0.09      6.90***    0.99 0.00     511.82***
log likelihood      −139.86             0.13   
NOTES: two-tailed, DF = 273 and 22, respectively
              *** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** Statistically significant at 5% level; * Statistically significant at 10% level
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in order to preserve the freshness of the yellowfin 
tuna (BFAR and WCPFC 2012). In order to lessen 
the fishing effort of the fishermen, they use fish-
aggregating devices or payaos; however, it has led 
to overfishing not only of adult tuna species but 
juvenile tuna as well (Babaran 2006). 
In terms of fuel usage, a 1% increase in the 
variable decreases total catch by 0.44%; however, 
with underreporting, the effect was positive. The 
positive effect of fuel consumption to tuna catch 
is similar to the results obtained by Squires and 
Kirkley (1999). Similarly, the actual level of fuel 
use showed a negative effect to catch productivity. 
High fuel consumption was an effect of the 
longer effort days (Carreon 2004; Padilla and 
Trinidad 1995) and farther distance (Barut and 
Garvilles 2014). Unlike in the past, fisher vessel’s 
fuel consumption is no longer subsidized by the 
Philippine government (Bailey et al. 2012). In 
Indonesia, 50% of the fishing vessel’s fuel cost is 
subsidized by the government, resulting to very 
competitive tuna prices (Sumaila et al. 2014). Fuel 
subsidy, however, may pose direct challenges to 
the sustainability of the tuna resources.
We also considered the fishing ground as 
potential factor affecting technical efficiency 
performance, and three fishing grounds in 
Mindanao were significant in the model: first, the 
Moro Gulf, which is known for its abundance of 
yellowfin tuna and skipjack tuna all year round 
(Bigelow et al. 2014); second, Centro, which is 
often referred to as Moro Gulf / Centro in the 
literature (Bigelow et al. 2014); and lastly,  the 
Mati City fishing ground, which is located near 
the Palau waters and is a good fishing ground 
for large bigeye tuna (Parducho and Palomares 
2014). Our results show that fishing at the Moro 
Gulf and Centro is technically inefficient in both 
models while fishing at Mati seas suggests higher 
efficiency performance.
Overall, the average technical efficiency 
scores of tuna vessels were overestimated at 0.80 
(2012), 0.70 (2013), and 0.72 (2014) using the 
panel data, but it was lower at 0.66 using the 
cross-section data (2014). Thus, there could be a 
6% overestimation of efficiency performance due 
to the underreporting of tuna catch. This implies 
that the actual performance of the handline tuna 
fishing vessels could be lower if reports of the 
inputs and catch levels are accurate.
Hence, our study found that there was a 
widespread underreporting in the handline fishery 
sector in the Philippines estimated at 51%−100%. 
Secondly, underreporting is more prevalent 
among fishing vessels of smaller size. Lastly, the 
effect of underreporting to the technical efficiency 
performance of the fishing vessels resulted to an 
overestimation of efficiency by 6%. This poses 
some methodological issues in the technical 




The legal measure to combat IUU fishing in the 
country has already been established. In 2013, 
the Philippine government issued the Executive 
Order 154 (EO 154), an adoption of a national 
plan of action to prevent, deter, and eliminate 
IUU fishing (Official Gazette 2013). This executive 
order provided a basis for the establishment of 
the Philippine Committee Against IUU Fishing, 
which was tasked to create regulations against IUU 
fishing activities, as well as institute measures for 
implementation. However, other than additional 
options on how fishermen may register their 
vessels, there were no further actions done in 
relation to EO 154 (Gutierez 2014). 
Due to the Philippines’ slow action against 
IUU fishing, the European Union (EU) issued 
a yellow card warning to the country in 2013, 
which could result to trade sanctions of Philippine 
exports if IUU remains unresolved in the next six 
months (European Commission 2014). In 2015, 
EO 154 was finally implemented through the 
release of implementing rules and regulations 
(Valencia 2015) and the yellow card warning from 
the EU was subsequently lifted (Binondo and Yan 
2015). Better compliance to FAO 236 or Rules 
and Regulations Involved in Fish Aggregating 
Devices Closure Period and the Fisheries Observer 
Program has also been recommended (Ramiscal 
et al. 2013). The Observer Program requires 
the fishing vessels to carry BFAR personnel on 
board and allow them to gather or verify data 
and recommend improvements in relation to 
conservation and management measures. Also, 
incentive mechanisms for sustainable fishing 
such as the International Seafood Sustainability 
12 ojs.upmin.edu.phBANWA B (2017) 12:res004
Foundation ProActive Vessel Register, Marine 
Stewardship Council Certification, and the World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature’s fishery improvement 
project model are now available for Filipino fishers 
(Tolentino-Zondervan et al. 2016).
Aside from these initiatives, policies relevant 
to minimize IUU activities include imposing a 
quota, taxing fish catch or fish effort, closing areas 
to fishing, and imposing higher penalties for IUU 
activities. Imposing quotas, as experienced by the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, can 
function as a redistribution scheme to manage 
the fishers’ behavior; those abiding by the rules 
will receive higher quota levels while those 
breaking the rules will receive lower quota levels 
(Stokke 2009). Quotas were implemented in the 
North Atlantic Ocean to combat IUU through 
the regional enforcement by the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT) and the national enforcement 
of the member-states (Sumaila et al. 2006). The 
introduction of individual transferable quotas 
(ITQ), where an individual is given a right to catch 
a percentage of fish from the total allowable catch 
(TAC), was aimed to achieve economic efficiency 
in fishing but may lead to stock collapse with 
uncertain stock estimates due to IUU activities 
(Sumaila 2010). 
One of the strategies to minimize IUU 
activities in the international market is through 
import taxes and placing tariffs, which makes the 
imported fish more expensive and thus reducing 
the profit for both fishers and importers (Sovacool 
and Siman-Sovacool 2008). Also, taxing fish 
effort would lead to fleet reduction, resulting to 
increased net benefits from the marine resources 
(Pauly et al. 2002). In the literature on IUU fishing, 
however, tax avoidance are possible by choosing a 
flag for convenience and non-compliance, which 
gives the vessel owner an economic advantage 
over those vessels following the rules (Miller and 
Sumaila 2014). Furthermore, middlemen in the 
fish trade in Mexico opt to remain underground 
and informal to continue patronizing the markets 
for IUU activities, which makes the fish cheaper 
because of low or non-reporting to avoid fiscal 
obligations (Pedroza 2013). In our study, we found 
similar motivations for local fishers to engage in 
IUU fishing.
Closing seas for a fishing season or specific 
fishing region are also among the strategies to 
reduce IUU activities in the Philippines. Seasonal 
closures were implemented in the Visayan Sea 
to encourage the spawning of fish (Ramos 2014) 
and the Sulu Sea and the Basilan Strait for sardine 
fishing (Pareño 2016). Also, seasonal closures for 
purse seine and ring netters to use fish-aggregating 
devices during the months of July to September 
were implemented (BFAR 2014). However, 
closures are only effective to some extent but 
cannot stop the depletion of resources, especially 
if the timing does not coincide with the spawning 
season of the fish (Yu and Yu 2008). 
As the fisheries sector is transitioning 
towards an ecosystem-based management, it 
is important that IUU fishing is minimized if 
not totally eradicated (Pauly et al. 2002). At the 
current stage of the fisheries development, the 
benefits involved in IUU fishing outweighs the 
cost twenty-four times (Sumaila et al. 2006). The 
current penalty levels of most countries do not act 
as a deterrent to IUU activities (Le Gallic and Cox 
2006). Aside from monetary penalty, Le Gallic and 
Cox (2006) identified vessel and catch confiscation 
and imprisonment as in the case of Indonesia as 
more effective measures. For the Philippines, it 
is practical to increase the penalties involved in 
IUU fishing and further improve the monitoring 
activities such as the Fisheries Observer Program.
Conclusion
The increasing demand for tuna exports put 
pressure on the sustainability of tuna fishing in 
the Philippines. Being one of the top exporters 
of tuna in the world, it is important that illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
be addressed to maintain the country’s global 
reputation and contribute to the sustainability 
of tuna fishing. However, as the fishermen sail 
farther from the Philippine exclusive economic 
zone to catch tuna in distant waters, including the 
High Seas and the Indonesian and Papua New 
Guinea seas, monitoring IUU activities becomes 
a challenging task. Handline tuna fishing, although 
more sustainable in terms of fishing practice, is a 
source of concern in terms of IUU fishing.
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Hence, we identified the level of IUU fishing 
in the country, particularly the underreporting 
of tuna catches. Also, we explored the drivers of 
IUU fishing and its implication to the efficiency of 
tuna vessels. We found widespread underreporting 
of tuna catches estimated at 51%−100% and 
prevalence of underreporting among vessels of 
smaller size. Influencing the handline fishers’ 
decision to engage in IUU activities are the need 
to generate extra income to support household 
needs, the drive to get a higher share of the profit 
vis-à-vis operators and vessel owners, and the 
deficient monitoring, control, and surveillance 
of fishing vessels by responsible agencies. Our 
results also show that longer effort days and 
higher fuel consumption do not necessarily 
translate to technical efficiency. This implies 
that limiting the effort days at sea have a positive 
effect on the efficiency level of the fishing vessels. 
Moreover, the increasing number of fishing vessels 
operating in the Moro Gulf and Centro fishing 
grounds suggests lower efficiency performance 
while fishing in the less distant seas of Mati is an 
efficient alternative. More distant and open access 
resource could be enticing in terms of the volume 
of catch but could be inefficient as suggested by 
the models. The actual efficiency level of the tuna 
handline fishers could be lower if actual levels of 
inputs and catch are accounted for. Sustainable 
management of tuna starts from the appropriate 
inventory of fish stocks. Hence, if catch reports are 
more accurate, the management of the fisheries 
becomes more sustainable. 
We recommend that penalties should be 
increased to discourage the fishermen from 
engaging in IUU activities. While we recognize 
the efforts of the country’s fisheries bureau to 
eradicate IUU activities, monitoring activities 
such as the Fisheries Observer Program need 
to be more frequent. Since small-scale fishers 
are more likely to engage in IUU activities, we 
recommend improving the enabling environment 
for the small-scale handline fishers by providing 
training support for livelihood opportunities for 
the housewives to provide extra sources of income, 
safety nets to support the household’s food 
security and income especially during off-fishing 
season, and empowerment of the community to 
sustainably manage marine resources.
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